Abstract. This paper is concerned about relating formal and computational models of cryptography in case of active adversaries when formal security analysis is done with first order logic As opposed to earlier treatments, we introduce a new, fully probabilistic method to assign computational semantics to the syntax. The idea is to make use of the usual mathematical treatment of stochastic processes, hence be able to treat arbitrary probability distributions, non-negligible probability of collision, causal dependence or independence, and so on. We present this via considering a simple example of such a formal model, the Basic Protocol Logic by K. Hasebe and M. Okada [20] , but we think the technique is suitable for a wide range of formal methods for protocol correctness proofs. We first review our framework of proof-system, BPL, for proving correctness of authentication protocols, and provide computational semantics. Then we give a full proof of the soundness theorem. We also comment on the differences of our method and that of Computational PCL.
Introduction
In the past few years, linking the formal and computational models of cryptography has become of central interest. Several different methods have emerged for both active and passive adversaries. In this paper we consider the relationship of the two models when formal security analysis is done with first order logic. Protocol correctness is analyzed by defining a syntax with adding some additional axioms (expressing security properties etc.) to the usual axioms and inference rules of first order logic and then proving some security property directly, instead of eliminating the possibility of successful (formal) adversaries. A logical proof then ensures that the property will be true in any formal model (semantics) of the syntax. The link to the computational world then is done by assigning a computational semantics (instead of formal) to the syntax, proving that the axioms and inference rules hold there, and hence a property correct in the syntax must be true in the computational model. However, as it turns out, it is not unambiguous how to define the computational semantics, and when a property should be deemed "true" computationally.
Recently, Datta et al. in [13] gave a computational semantics to the syntax of their Protocol Composition Logic of [16, 12] (cf. also [1] for a protocol composition logic project overview). In their treatment, every action by the honest participants is recorded on each (non-deterministic) execution trace, and bit strings emerging later are checked whether they were recorded earlier and to what action they corresponded (the only actions of the adversary that are recorded are send and receive). This way, they first define whether a formula is true on a particular trace (more exactly this is only true for a formula not containing their predicate Indist), and they say the formula is true in the model if it is true on an overwhelming number of traces. This method however, since it focuses on coincidences on individual traces, discards a large amount of information carried by the probabilistic structure of the protocol execution, and defines satisfaction and validity of formulas ignoring that information. As the comparisons are done on each trace separately it is not possible to track independence, correlations. But there are more serious problems too, as we will discuss later -such as, some of the syntactic axioms are defined through the semantics. We do not claim that it is impossible to fix these issues in their framework, but we suggest a different viewpoint in which these issues can be easily eliminated.
Our approach puts more emphasis on probabilities. Instead of defining what is true on each trace, we say -roughly speaking -that a property is true in the model if a "cross-section" of traces provides the right probabilities for computational realizations of the property in question. An underlying stochastic structure ensures that can detect if something depends on the past or does not. It is not coincidences on traces that we look for, but indistinguishable probability distributions.
We introduce our method on a rather simple syntax, namely, a somewhat modified version of Basic Protocol Logic (or BPL, for short) by K. Hasebe and M. Okada [20] and leave extensions to more complex situations such as the Protocol Composition Logic to future work. The reason for this is partly to avoid distraction by an elaborate formal model from the main ideas, but also that a complete axiomatization of the syntax used by Datta et al. for their computational PCL has not yet been published anywhere, important details of the formalization is not yet publicly available. We would like to emphasize though that our point is not to give a computational semantics to BPL but to provide a technique that works well in much more general situations as well.
BPL is a logical inference system to prove correctness of a protocol. Originally, it included signatures as well, but for simplicity, we leave that out from this analysis. BPL was defined to give a simple formulation of a core part of the protocol logics (PCL) of [16, 12, 11] for proving some aimed properties in the sense of [25, 22] within the framework of first order logic; all notions and assumptions are strictly formulated by the first order logical language explicitly. Contrary to PCL, in BPL there are no explicit encrypt, decrypt, match actions, only nonce generation, send and receive. The version which we utilized as a simple sample of formal rule-based model in this paper does not accomodate some correctness proofs such as secrecy-properties although one could extend BPL to support them. Besides the usual axioms and derivation rules of first order logic, further axioms set the behavior of equality and subterm relations of terms created via pairing and encryption, two nonce-veryfication axioms incorporating the notion that only the person with the correct decryption key can read what is inside an encryption, and an axiom about the order of events in traces. Although this system is very simple, given a protocol (as we will indicate in the case of agreement in NSL), the nonce-veryfication axioms forcing certain messages to be included in others, and then the term axioms restricting what a certain pair of terms in a subterm relation can possibly be, the required property can be verified. ensure soundness for computational semantics, some modifications of the original syntax of BPL were necessary:
1. Instead of denoting encryptions as {m} A , which was used in the original version of the purely symbolic model-based BPL inference system, we indicate the random seed of the encryption as {m} r A (as Datta et al. do). As it turned out, a consistent computational interpretation is much harder, if not impossible without the random seed in the syntax.
2. The original subterm and equiterm axioms were not all computationally sound so we just take a certain subset, the elements of which we know that they are computationally sound. We are not taking all the sound term axioms, as it is not known how to give a complete characterization of them. 4 The original BPL also proved completeness for formal semantics with the original set of axioms, however, we do not consider completeness in this paper. It is an open question whether anything about completeness can be said in the computational case.
We then define the computational semantics. This involves giving a stochastic structure that results when the protocol is executed. Principals output bit strings (as opposed to terms) with certain probability distributions. The bit strings are then recorded in a trace as being generated, sent or received by some principal. This provides a probability distribution of traces. We show how to answer whether a bit string corresponding to a term was sent around with high probability or not. For example a formal term {M } r A was sent around in the computational model if a cross-section of all traces provides the correct probability distribution that corresponds to sending {M } r A . Or, a nonce N was generated, if another cross-section provides the right probabilities, and that distribution must be independent of everything that happened earlier. This way we define when a certain formula in the syntax is true in the computational semantics. We then analyze whether the axioms of the syntax are true in the semantics, and if they are, then we conclude that a formula that can be proved in the syntax is also true in the semantics.
Related Work. Formal methods emerged from the seminal work of Dolev and Yao [15] , whereas computational cryptography grew out of the work of Goldwasser and Micali [17] . The first to link the two methods were Abadi and Rogaway in [3] "soundness" for passive adversaries in case of so-called type-0 security. A number of other papers for passive adversaries followed, proving "completness" [23, 5] , generalizing for weaker, more realistic encryptions schemes [5] , considering purely probabilistic encryptions [19, 5] , including limited models for active adversaries [21] , addressing the issue of forbidding key-cycles [4] , considering algebraic operations and static equivalence [8, 2] . Other approaches including active adversaries are considered by Backes et al. and Canetti in their reactive simulatability [6] and universal composability [10] frameworks, respectively. Non trace properties were investigated elsewhere too, however, not in the context of first order logic. A brief account of this present work was given in [7] .
Organization of this paper. In Section 2, we outline the syntax of Basic Protocol Logic. In Section 3, we give a computational semantics to Basic Protocol Logic, and discuss soundness. Finally, in Section 4, we conclude and present directions for future work.
In this section, we present the syntax of Basic Protocol Logic modified to be suitable for computational interpretation. For the original BPL, please consult [20] .
Language
Sorts and terms. Our language is order-sorted, with sorts coin , name, nonce and message such that terms of sorts name and nonce are terms of sort message. Let C name be a finite set of constants of sort name (which represent principal names), and C nonce a finite set of constants of sort nonce. Let C coin be a finite set of constants of sort coin. The sort coin represent the random input of encryptions. We require countably infinite variables for each sort. We will use  A, Formulas. We introduce a number of predicate symbols: P generates ν, P receives t, P sends t, t = t ′ , t ⊆ t ′ , t ⊆ P t ′ , t ⊆ ¬P t ′ and |t 1 ⊆ t 2 ⊆ t 3 | which represent "P generates a fresh value ν as a nonce", "P receives a message of the form t", "P sends a message of the form t", "t is identical with t ′ ", "t is a subterm of t ′ ", "t is a subterm of t ′ such that t can be received from t ′ decrypting only with the private key of P ", "t is a subterm of t ′ such that t can be received from t ′ without decrypting with the private key of P ", "t 1 ⊆ t 2 ⊆ t 3 and the only way t 1 occurs in t 3 is within t 2 ", respectively. The first three are called action predicates, and the meta expression acts is used to denote one of the action predicates: generates, receives and sends. We also introduce the trace predicate P 1 acts 1 t 1 ; P 2 acts 2 t 2 ; · · · ; P k acts k t k . A trace predicate is used to represent a sequence of the principals' actions such as "P sends a message m, and after that, Q receives a message m ′ ". Atomic formulas are either of the form
The first one we also call trace formula. We also use α 1 ; · · · ; α k (or α in short) to denote P 1 acts 1 t 1 ; · · · ; P k acts k t k (where k indicates the length of α). When every P i is identical with P for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then α P denotes such a trace formula. For α (≡ α 1 ; · · · ; α m ) and β (≡ β 1 ; · · · ; β n ), we say β includes α (denoted by α ⊆ β), if there is a one-to-one, increasing function j : {1, ..., m} → {1, ..., n} such that α i ≡ β j(i) . Formulas are defined by
where m is any variable. Those variables in a formula that are bound by the binding operators ∃ and ∀ will be referred to as bound variables, those that are not will be referred to as free variables. We consider the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public key protocol [24] , whose informal description is as follows.
Initiator's and responder's roles of the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol (denoted by Init N S and Resp N S , respectively) are described as the following formulas.
Init
They further have to agree that
Remark 1. Notice that, for example, in the responder's role, we wrote B receives {n 1 
B , although n 1 may come from the adversary. This is, because we will assume in the semantics, that because of tagging, it is recognizable whether a string is a nonce or not. But, the distribution of n 1 , if coming from the adversary, may not follow the correct distribution of nonces.
The Axioms of Basic Protocol Logic
We extend the usual first-order predicate logic with equality by adding the following axioms (I), (II) and (III).
Remark 2.
For the axioms below to be more understandable, we make a few remarks about the semantics that we will define later. For each η, names will be interpreted as some constant bit string names of the participating principals, such that the principals corresponding to constants will generate nonces, keys and encrypt honestly. Other possible principles may be malicious, creating encryptions and nonces dishonestly. Nonces will have to have a certain fixed length, the interpretation of nonce constants will have to have the correct distribution and be independent of what happened earlier. The interpretation of coins will have to have the correct form for the random feed into the encryption, and further, constants of sort coin will have to have the correct distribution, and when used for encryption, such a constant coin will have to have a distribution that is independent of the distribution of encrypted plaintext as well as independent of everything that happened earlier. The public keys of constants will also have to have the correct distributions and be generated at the very beginning. The interpretation of encryptions and pairing are defined the intuitive way.
(I) Term axioms. Consider the setC of all variables and constants of each of sort name, sort nonce and sort coin. LetĀ be the free algebra constructed fromC via 〈·, ·〉 and {·} · · (with the appropriate sorts in the indexes of the encryption terms) not including constants and variables of sort coin. The elements ofĀ are of sort message. Let ⊆Ā denote the natural subterm relation inĀ. Let t ⊆Ā P t ′ mean that t ⊆Ā t ′ such that t can be received from t ′ by decrypting encryptions by the key of P only. Let t ⊆Ā ¬P t ′ mean that t ⊆Ā t ′ such that t can be received from t ′ by decrypting encryptions that are not done with the key of P .
Let |t 1 ⊆Ā t 2 ⊆Ā t 3 | mean that t 1 ⊆Ā t 2 ⊆Ā t 3 and the only way t 1 occurs in t 3 is within t 2 . That is:
We postulate the following term axioms. Here, and also later by using ⊆ (¬)P we mean two sentences, one with and one without ¬. Let m be all variables occurring in the corresponding terms. We require these for all A, B ∈ C name :
is true inĀ for all (possibly equal) constant or variable substitutions to m and Q, then it is an axiom.
(II) Rules for trace formulas. We postulate that β → α for α ⊆ β and
where γ i 's are the list of order-preserving merges of α and β. These axioms express the intuition that if a trace "happens", then a subtrace of it also happens, and two traces happen if and only if one of their possible merges happen.
(III) Axioms for relationship between properties. We introduce the following set of formulas as non-logical axioms. These axioms represent some properties about nonces and cryptographic assumptions.
(1) Ordering:
(2) Nonce verification 1: For each A, B constants of sort name, r constant of sort coin, we postulate
(3) Nonce verification 2: For each A, B C of sort name (where A and C may coincide), r 1 , r 2 constants of sort coin, we postulate we postulate
There are other possible axiomatizations, but the authors of [20] found this particularly useful (more exactly a somewhat less general version). The meaning of the Ordering axiom is clear. Nonce verfication 1 and 2 are based on the idea of the authentication-tests [18] . Nonce verification 1 means that if A generated a nonce n 1 that Q received in m 5 , and A only sent n 1 encrypted with the public key of B always in a given form {m 6 } r B , and Q received this nonce in some other form, then the encrypted nonce had to go through B, and before that, it had to be actually sent out by A. The reason that we require A and B to be names and not arbitrary variables is that we do not want to require any principals in an arbitrary run to encrypt securely. Nonce verification 2 means that with the premises of Nonce verification 1, and if B sends n 1 only inside {m 8 } r2 C , and C never sends n 1 unless C = A, then C had to receive {m 8 } r2 C so that it is accessible to him.
Query form and correctness properties
We introduce a general form of formulas, called query form, to represent our aimed correctness properties. In order to make the discussion simpler, we consider only the case of two party authentication protocols, however our query form can be easily extended so as to represent the correctness properties with respect to other types of protocols which include more than two principals.
Definition 1. (Query form) Query form is a formula of the following form: ∃mHonest(α
We present the precise definition of Only(α B ) and of Honest(α A ) in the Appendix. Only(α B ) means that B performs only the actions of α B , and nothing else, whereas Honest(α A ) represents "A performs only a run of an initial segment of α A which ends with a sending action or the last action of α A ". For example, from responder's (namely, B's) view, the non-injective agreement of the protocol
Example 2. (Agreement property in the responder's view of the NSL protocol) The initiator's honesty of the NSL protocol is Honest(Init
We refer to Remark 1 for an explanation why nonce variables are used for even those nonces that are sent by the adversary.
The main steps of proving agreement from the responder's view are the following:
implies by the 1st nonce verification axiom that
Then from this together with ∃Q 1 n 2 s 2 Honest(Init
From this, using the term axioms (f), (i) and (k), we get that 
Computational Semantics

Computational Asymmetric Encryption Schemes
The fundamental objects of the computational world are strings, strings = {0, 1} * , and families of probability distributions over strings. These families are indexed by a security parameter η ∈ param := {1} * ≡ N (which can be roughly understood as key-length).
Definition 2 (Negligible Function). A function f : N → R is said to be negligible, if for any
Pairing is an injective pairing function [·, ·] : strings×strings → strings. We assume that changing a bit string in any of the argument to another bit string of the same length does not influence the length of the output of the pairing. An encryption scheme is a triple of algorithms (K, E, D) with key generation K, encryption E and decryption D. Let plaintexts, ciphertexts, publickey and secretkey be nonempty subsets of strings. The set coins is some probability field of (possibly infinite) bit-strings that stands for coin-tossing, i.e. feeds randomness into the Turing-machines realizing the algorithms. In this paper, we assume that the encryption scheme satisfies adaptive chosen ciphertext security (CCA-2) defined the following way:
Definition 3 (Encryption Scheme). A computational asymmetric encryption scheme is a triple of algorithms E = (K, E, D) where:
Definition 4 (Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Security). A computational public-key encryption scheme E = (K, E, D) provides indistinguishability under the adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack if for all PPT adversaries A and for all sufficiently large security parameter η: In the above definition, what the brackets of the probability contains, is a commonly used shorthand for the following game: First a public key-private key pair is generated on input 1 η , as well as a random bit b with probabilities 1/2 -1/2. Then, the adversary is given the public key, and a decryption oracle, which it can invoke as many times as wished, and at the end it comes up with a pair of bit strings m 0 , m 1 of the same length, which it hands to an encryption oracle. Out of these two messages, the oracle encrypts the one determined by the initial choice of random bit b, and hands the ciphertext back to the adversary. The adversary can further invoke the decryption oracle (which decrypts everything except for the ciphertext computed by the encryption oracle). At the end, the adversary has to make a good guess for b. This guess is g, and the adversary wins if the probability of making a good guess significantly differs from 1/2.
It was shown in [9] that the above definition is equivalent with another that seems stricter at first, namely, when an n-tuple of encryption and decryption oracles are given, each with separate encryption and decryption keys, but using the same bit b to choose from the submitted plaintexts. The adversary is allowed to invoke the oracles in any order but it cannot submit a message that was received from an encryption oracle to the corresponding decryption oracle.
Filtrations and Stopping Times
In the following, we discuss the mathematical objects that we use to represent a computational execution of a protocol. Our plan is to define a computational semantics, show that the syntactic axioms hold if the encryption scheme is CCA-2 secure, and, as a result, if the query-form (or anything else) is provable in the syntax, it must be true in any computational model. First, since probabilities and complexity are involved, we need a probability space for each value of the security parameter. Since time plays an important role in the execution, what we need is the probability space for a stochastic process. For the presentation here, we limit ourselves to finite probability spaces as explaining the notion of measurability and stochastic processes is much simpler this way, but for anyone familiar with these notions in infinite spaces it is near to trivial to generalize the method to allowing infinite steps (but polynomial expected runtime). So, here we assume that for each security parameter, there is a maximum number of execution steps n η . The following notions that we introduce are standard in probability theory.
We will denote the finite probability space for an execution of a protocol with security parameter η by Ω η , subsets of which are called events. Let F η denote the set of all subsets of Ω η (including the empty set). A subset containing only one element is called an elementary event. The set Ω η is meant to include all randomness of an execution of the protocol. A probability measure p η assigns a probability to each subset such that it is additive with respect to disjoint unions of sets (so it is enough to assign a probability to each element of Ω η , then the probability of any subset can be computed). When it is clear which probability space we are talking about, we will just use the notation Pr.
In 
We included F 
. In this case, we say that g η is measurable with respect to F η i . We will, however need a somewhat more complex dependence-notion. We will need to consider random variables that are determined by the randomness until step i 1 on certain random paths, but until step i 2 on other paths, and possibly something else on further paths. We will also have to assume that the stopping times are such that they are polynomially decidable, that is, in the execution of a PPT algorithm, the computation of value of a stopping time on an execution trace should not destroy the polynomial bound. This is not really a restriction as in case of security properties, stopping times are just decided simply by the position of the protocol execution, carrying out some decryptions, and matching values.
Stochastic Model for the Computational Execution of BPL
For each value of the security parameter, an execution of the protocol involves some principals. Each principal has a distinct name, a bit-string not longer than the upper bound n η . Each principal generates an encryption-key, decryption-key pair at the initialization. has no bit-string value on that particular execution). This set describes the nonces that were generated during the execution of the protocol. The nonces generated by honest participants must have some fixed distribution (uniform for example) over set of bit strings with the given length and also have to be independent of what happened earlier when they are being generated, but we will require this later in the definition of interpretation of constants and at the definition of the satisfaction of the formula A generates N .
Let R be a set of elements of the form R = {R η } η∈param where R η : Ω η → coins ∪ {⊥}. Messages: Let the set of messages be M elements of the form M = {M η } η∈param , where 
We have to define what we mean by a computational pairing and encryption. For any X, X 1 , X 2 ∈ D M , we write that X = C 〈X 1 , X 2 〉, if for some (hence for all)
is an element of X. Further, if A ∈ P, and R ∈ R, then we will write that
If the value of any of the input distributions is ⊥ then we take the output to be ⊥ as well. This way, we can consider an element of the free term algebra For any set of subsets
Execution trace: The execution trace is defined as Tr = {Tr η } η∈param where Tr η : ω → Tr η (ω) with either
where for each η security parameter, 
We also require that for each i there is a stopping time J i with J j (ω) < J j+1 (ω) for all ω and j such that Tr η i is measurable with respect to F η Ji for all i. Moreover, we require that any of Tr is PPT computable from the earlier ones.
Computational Semantics
We now explain how to give computational semantics to the syntax, and what it means that a formula of the syntax is true in the semantics. For a given security parameter, an execution is played by a number of participants.
Assumptions. In a particular execution, we assume that the principals corresponding to names in the syntax (that is, they correspond to elements in C name ) are regular (non-corrupted). We assume that these participants generate their keys and encrypt correctly (that is, the keys are properly distributed, and also r is properly randomized) with a CCA-2 encryption scheme, and never use their private keys in any computation except for decryption. For other participants (possibly corrupted), we do not assume this. (Encrypting correctly is essential to able to prove the nonce verification axioms.) We further assume that pairing of any two messages differs from any nonce and from any principal name on sets of non-negligible probability (this can be achieved by tagging; in any case, we will call this tagging condition), and that honestly generated nonces have some fixed distribution over a set of bit strings with fixed length such that their collision probability is negligible in η. The network is completely controlled by an adversary. The sent and received bit strings are recorded in a trace in the order they happen. Freshly generated bit-strings produced by the regular participants are also recorded. The combined algorithms of the participants and the adversary are assumed to be probabilistic polynomial time. We also assume that at one time only one action happens.
Such a situation, with the definitions of the previous section, produces a computational trace structure associated with the execution of the form
η a sequence of subsets where we focus our attention with p η (D η ) non-negligible; N 0 = {N η 0 } η is the distribution of correctly generated nonces; Φ C is a one-toone function on C name ∪ C nonce ∪ C coin such that (i) Φ C (A) ∈ D P for any A ∈ C name such that η has the distribution fixed for coins (e.g. uniform), and
An extension of Φ C to evaluation of free variables is a function Φ that is the same on constants as Φ C , and for variables Q, n, m, s of sort name, nonce, message, and coin respectively,
, and Φ(s) ∈ R hold. LetΦ be defined to be the same as Φ on constants and variables, and let's extend the definition ofΦ to any term such that it takes values in
We say that an ensemble of random variables
, r being a constant, then we further require that there is an
In the following, we give the interpretation of BPL. Note, that the interpretation of conjunction, disjunction, negation and conclusion are defined in the most standard manner. We first define when a formula ϕ is satisfied by Φ (remember,
such that the bottom of the parsing tree of X i agrees with the parsing tree of t i , and the interpretation of constants and variables in t i is given on D by the sub-trees rooted in the corresponding positions in X i , and further that also |X 1 ⊆ T (DM ) X 2 ⊆ T (DM ) X 3 | holds where this is defined the same way on T (D M ) as we defined it onĀ, that is, X 1 occurs in X 3 only within X 2 .
-For any term u and acts = sends/receives, ϕ ≡ P acts u is satisfied by Φ iff there is a polynomially decidable stopping time J η such that apart from sets of negligible probability, Tr
We also require that the interpretation of every constant and variable in u be measurable with respect to F η J . We will denote this as Tr J ≪ Φ,D P acts u. -If acts = generates then the u above is a nonce ν, and so -ϕ ≡ β 1 , ..., β n sequence of actions is satisfied by Φ if each of β k (k = 1, ..., n) is satisfied by Φ, and if J k is the stopping time belonging to β k , then we require that
-For any formulas ϕ, ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , ¬ϕ is satisfied by Φ iff ϕ is not satisfied by Φ; ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 is satisfied by Φ iff ϕ 1 is satisfied by Φ or ϕ 2 is satisfied by Φ; ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 is satisfied by Φ iff ϕ 1 is satisfied by Φ and ϕ 2 is also satisfied by Φ. ϕ 1 → ϕ 2 is satisfied by Φ iff ¬ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 is satisfied by Φ. -If ϕ is a formula, m a variable, then ∀mϕ (or ∃mϕ, resp. ) is satisfied by Φ iff ϕ is satisfied by each (or some, resp.)
A formula ϕ is true in the structure M, iff ϕ is satisfied by every Φ extension of Φ C . If in a structure, the Basic Protocol Logic axioms are true (in which case the structure is called model), then by standard arguments of first order logic, it follows that everything provable in the syntax is true in the model. In particular, if the query form is provable in the syntax, then it must be true in any model. We now turn our attention to whether the axioms are satisfied by a structure.
Truth of the Term axioms.
(a) These axioms are true since if terms are equal in the free algebraĀ, then their interpretations are also equal, no matter how Φ is extended to variables. Further, if t ⊆ t ′ holds in the free algebra, then the way we receive t ′ from t by pairing and encryptions carries over to the computational world, no matter how Φ is evaluated on variables. Same is true for ⊆ P . As for ⊆ ¬Q , it is made sure that in the free algebra t can be received from t ′ without encrypting with the key of the substitution for Q as long as it is not equal the P 's. Since the explicit inclusion in the free algebra carries over to the interpretation, the formula must be satisfied. (b) These axioms hold as computational equality is also symmetric, reflexive and transitive. Further, subterm relation is also transitive for the interpretations. Q are computationally equal up to negligible probability, then the interpretations of t 1 and t 2 must also be equal up to negligible probability as the decryptions of both sides with the decryption key of Q give the interpretations of the encrypted terms:
) and the right-hand sides are equal up to negligible probability. (e) Soundness of this axiom follows as we supposed that computational pairing is one-to-one. (f) These follow from the tagging condition as tagging ensures that encryption is never confused with pairs, nonces, names. (g) Follows from tagging. (h) Soundness of the first formula follows as if t ⊆ 〈t 1 , t 2 〉 is satisfied, then either the interpretations of the two sides are equal (up to negligible probability) and hence t = 〈t 1 , t 2 〉 is satisfied, or (by definition of satisfaction of t ⊆ 〈t 1 , t 2 〉) the interpretation of 〈t 1 , t 2 〉 can be received from the interpretation of t via encryptions and pairing, of which the last has to be pairing because the tags have to match; then by soundness of (e), it follows that the paired items must in fact be interpretations of t 1 and t 2 , which implies that either of the interpretations of t 1 or of t 2 was received from the interpretation of t via pairing and encryptions, which means that either t ⊆ t 1 or t ⊆ t 2 is satisfied, and that proofs the soundness of this formula. As for the second formula, if t 1 ⊆ {t 2 } s Q is satisfied, then either the interpretations of the two sides are equal, or the interpretation of {t 2 } s Q can be received from the interpretation of t 1 via encryptions and pairing, of which the last has to be encryption because the tags have to match, and so soundness follows. Truth of the Nonce verification axioms. In order to show that the axioms are satisfied, we use the assumption that regular participants (the ones represented by constants) encrypt with a CCA-2 secure encryption scheme. For the first nonce-verification axiom, suppose there is a Φ and nonnegligible D such that the premise of the axioms are satisfied by Φ on D, but the conclusion is not. Then, if the conclusion is not satisfied, that means that either A never sends the nonce out (which clearly cannot happen with non-negligible probability as later Q receives it and the probability of collision of nonces is negligible), or {m 6 } r B does not go through B between A sending it and Q receiving it with non-negligible probability. The premise however says that n 1 shows up in m 5 later in another form, and it can be recovered from there up to negligible probability via a series of de-coupling and decryption such that the key of B does not have to be used. We have to show that a PPT algorithm can be constructed that breaks CCA-2 security.
First observe, that the satisfaction of ∀m 7 (A sends m 7 ∧ n 1 ⊆ m 7 → |n 1 ⊆ {m 6 } r B ⊆ m 7 |) means that B indeed sent n 1 out only in the form of {m 6 } r B . The reason is that if, according to the satisfaction of this formula, there are
C X 2 and Φ(m 7 ) = C X 3 on D so that X 1 occurs in X 3 , but only within X 2 , then there cannot be any way to create X 3 at the point when A sends it first out other than from Φ({m 6 } r B ), because otherwise without the decryption of Φ({m 6 } r B ) we could access n 1 contradicting the CCA-2 security of Φ({m 6 } r B ). Why is this encryption CCA-2? Because at the first time when n 1 is sent out, r had to be created by A, and hence never revealed to anyone. The fact that we assume in the interpretation of {m 6 } r B that r has to be independent of what happened earlier and that m 6 has to be part of the earlier history, ensures that this term is not confused by any other encryption that was sent out by A. 10. Recover the sample for n 1 via de-coupling and decryption. The bit string hence obtained is the one that was in the plaintext encrypted by the oracles, so the bit value b of the game can be determined. 11. If any one of 2., 3., 6., or 7. does not happen on an execution trace then proceed to the end and output a random guess of b. This is again PPT algorithm given that the protocol execution was PPT, so it breaks CCA-2 security.
Soundness Since the axioms are true in the structure M, by a standard argument of first order logic, the following theorem is true:
Theorem 1. With our assumptions on the execution of the protocol, if the associated computational trace structure is
M = (Π, E, [·, ·], N 0 , Pr, P, Tr, Φ C , D), then,
if a formula (the query form in particular) is provable in the syntax with first-order predicate logic and axioms (I), (II), (III), then it is true in M.
Proof. We have showed that the term axioms and non-logical axioms of BPL are true in the model. It is routine to check that all the logical axioms and logical inference rules of first order logic are also true in the model, because we followed the usual first-order logical operations of composed formulas in the interpretation. Hence the theorem holds.
Our semantics and Computational PCL
We would like to point out some aspects where problems arise in case of the treatment of Datta et al. and how they are related to our treatment. We emphasize that we do not claim that these issues are impossible to be fixed in their framework, we only indicate what our answers are to them. 1. Their treatment is non-deterministic, that is, they rely on counting equiprobable traces. Unequal probabilities may be dealt with by counting a trace more then once (although a priori it is not quite clear whether this will lead to problems), but their method certainly only applies to executions when the number of possible computational traces for a given security parameter is finite. Since some formulations of probabilistic polynomial time processes are not limited to finitely many traces (only the expected termination time must be polynomial), it is better not to exclude infinite number of traces. Our method works for infinite number of traces and arbitrary probability distributions. Removing the bound n η from the length of executions is not a difficult step (change the finite sequence of the filtration to an infinite one, and the definition of measurability to the standard one for infinite spaces) in our framework, only the presentation of the definition of measurability is more involved in this case, that is why we chose to stick to the bound. It is perhaps worthwhile to note that although manipulations with expected polynomial time algorithms may lead out of their realm, the proof of the nonce-verification axioms only involve minor modifications (no compositions of two expected PT algorithms) of the expected polynomial-time protocol execution that should not lead out of the realm. (Send(X, t) ). Let us now not be bothered by the problem that they define a syntactic axiom using the semantics. Here,X is a principle, t is a term, [b] X is an action b carried out by principalX in thread X assuming also that nothing else is carried out. In other words, it is an axiom that ifX did not send t before action b, then it did not send it even after action b as long as no σ evaluates b and Send(X, t) the same way. However, if there is even one coincidence in their evaluations, that prevents the axiom. We think this is an unnecessary restriction. As long as the probability distributions are different (up to negligibility) for any computational interpretation of b and Send(X, t), we can include ¬Send(X, t) [b] X ¬Send(X, t) in our axioms. We did not introduce modal formulas here in the syntax, and it is our work in progress to extend our approach to PCL. As we keep track of the actual probability distributions and correlations, it should be no problem to define the semantics of modal formulas so that these axioms hold as long as the interpretations (distributions, not bit-strings) of b and Send(X, t) are different up to negligible probability.
3. A further problem, that even makes the soundness proofs of Datta et al. questionable is the following: They define a formula (e.g. Send(X, t)) to be true in the model if it holds on all traces except for some with negligible probability. They ignore the fact that the position of Send(X, t) on the traces may vary badly from trace to trace, for example, may depend on the future of the trace. A simple example of such a situation is when on two traces, which coincide up to step t 0 , say, Send(X, t) is chosen on one trace for t 1 < t 0 , but on the other trace it is chosen somewhere else. Since the two traces coincide at step t 1 , if this time is picked on one trace, it must be picked on the other trace too. Maybe it is possible to prove that if there is a bad choice of the positions then there is a good choice as well, but we see no indication of such concerns in the papers of Datta et al. As we suggest to use the standard tool of filtration, according to which random variables have to be measurable, dependence on the future is taken care of by measurability.
4. Finally, ignoring probability distributions and correlations give rise to pathologies like this one, putting further doubts at the correctness of their soundness proofs: Suppose that the encryption scheme is such that for any n 1 , n 2 bit-strings generated randomly as nonces, any public key bit-string k 2 and any random seed r 2 for the encryption, there is another public key bit-string k 1 and a random seed r 1 such that {n 1 } ). This is however pathologic, and is a consequence of ignoring the fact that k 1 , if created by the adversary, cannot correlate with n 1 , which was not yet sent around. Furthermore, this seems to contradict their axiom (which though does not appear in their computational PCL papers) saying that FirstSend(X, t, t ′ ) ∧ a(Y, t ′′ ) → Send(X, t ′ ) < a(Y, t ′′ ) where X ̸ = Y and t subterm of t ′′ (meaning in our case that the first send action of A sending N had to occur before B could do anything with N ) in Section 4.7 of [14] . This problem persists even if such a coincidence cannot be efficiently computed. In our method, we required that the distribution of keys are measurable with respect to F η 0 , and generated nonces are independent of the past, so this anomaly cannot happen as N and K must have independent interpretations. The reader may be worried that we don't require that the generated R has to be dependent of N as R is generated by the adversary or a corrupted participant. It is true that we could introduce another filtration that indicates the knowledge of the adversary up to a certain time, which may be needed in a more complex syntax (for example if we allow corrupted participants to generate their keys sometime in the middle), however, in BPL this is not necessary as this does not result in undesired coincidences and the proofs work even without this tool.
Conclusions
We have given a computational semantics to Basic Protocol Logic that uses stochastic structures, and showed a soundness theorem. In order to show that the axioms of BPL were true in the semantics, we had to modify BPL as the original axioms were not all computationally sound. We showed our method on BPL as it is simple enough for a first, concise presentation. As the idea of making use of the notions from the theory of stochastic processes in the definition of satisfaction of formulas does not require the special properties of BPL, we believe that it should not be difficult to adopt this method to a wide range of formal models such as PCL or strand space models.
A Definition of Only and Honest
Our aimed correctness properties are described in a special form of formulas, called query form. , which is defined as follows, the intuitive meaning being that A follows the role α A and does nothing else, but it may not complete it:
Only(α A ) denotes the following formula, whose intuitive meaning is "A performs only α A ". 
Only(α
